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et al.: Speech or Debate Clause

SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
N. . CONST. art. III, § 11:
Forany speech or debate in either house of the legislature, the
members shall not be questioned in any otherplace.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6(1):
1The Senators and Representatives,] . . . for any Speech or
Debate in either House,... shall not be questioned in any other
Place.
COURT OF APPEALS
117 7
People v. Ohrenstein

(decided November 27, 1990)

Manfred Ohrenstein, minority leader of the senate, along with
other state senators and legislative assistants, were indicted for
using staff members to work on political campaigns for members
8
of his party seeking election or re-election to the senate. 117 The
state claimed that in addition to violating the penal law, 1179 the
1177. 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1990).
1178. Id. at 43, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The indictment
alleged that defendant Ohrenstein conspired with other state senators to use
staff employees in seven senate campaigns in which incumbents were
considered vulnerable. Id. It was alleged that the defendants used current staff
members to work on the campaigns, hired new staff members specifically to
work on the political campaigns, and placed staff members on the payroll even
though they were not expected to perform, but rather were "no-show"
employees. Id. at 43-44, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
1179. The defendants were charged with violating various sections of the
New York Penal Law dealing with theft, filing false instruments, certifying
that members performed "proper duties" and larceny. Id. at 45-46, 565
N.E.2d at 496, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 747. Although the prosecutor conceded that
some political activities are permissible, their objection was that the conduct in
question was "too political." Id. at 48, 565 N.E.2d at 497, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
748.
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defendants conduct violated the New York constitutional provision prohibiting the use of state monies for private undertak-

ings. 1180

Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment and advanced several defenses. First, the defendants asserted that staff employees
are permitted to engage in political activities and that there was
no statute which declared it a crime to use staff members during
political campaigns. 1181 Second, the defendants claimed that they
were entitled to legislative immunity under the speech or debate
clause of the state constitution. 1182 Third, the defendants
contended that their due process rights were violated because
there was no notice that their acts were prohibited. 1183 Finally,
they argued that "the attempt by the prosecutor to define or limit
the proper duties of legislative assistants constituted an
unconstitutional intrusion by the executive branch

. . .

into the

Legislature's affairs in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine."

118 4

The trial court dismissed all the counts relating to the senate
employees who participated in political campaigns in addition to
1185
performing "other assignments while on the senate payroll."
The court held that prosecution "was prohibited by the separation
of powers doctrine and the legislative immunity provided by the
State Constitution." 1186 However, the court denied the
defendants' motion with regard to counts which alleged that
certain staff members worked exclusively on the campaigns and
those which alleged that employees were paid regardless of
1180. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 ("The money of the State shall not be given
or loaned to or in aid of any private corporation . . . or private under-

taking ....").
1181. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 44, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
746.
1182. Id.; see N.Y. CONsT. art. III, § 11.
1183. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 44, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
746; see N.Y. CONsr..art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.").

1184. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 44, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
746.
1185. Id. at 44-45, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 746.

1186. Id. at 45, 565 N.E.2d at 495, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
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whether they performed any duties. 1187
The state appealed to the appellate division with regard to the
dismissed counts. In addition, the defendants appealed with regard to the counts which had not been dismissed and claimed that
"the indictment constituted an unwarranted intrusion by the executive into legislative affairs and that legislative immunity was
applicable." 1188 The appellate division affirmed the counts which
the state appealed. Moreover, with respect to the defendant's
appeal, the court concluded that legislative immunity and separation of powers doctrine prohibited the prosecution of the remaining counts relating to the campaign workers. 1189 Furthermore,
the court determined that the defendants were denied due process
under the state constitution because "the law did not give the
defendants fair warning that [their conduct] was criminally
prohibited." 1190 However, the court decided, as did the trial
court, that the state could prosecute the defendants with respect to
the counts relating to the "no-show"
employees. 119 1
Consequently, both the defendants and the state appealed to the
New York Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals held that under the law, as it existed prior
to 1987,1192 criminal charges could not be sustained in
connection with the use of staff members who worked on the
political campaigns. 1 193 However, prosecution for placing noshow employees on the payroll was permissible and did not
violate either the separation of powers doctrine or legislative

1187. Id.
1188. Id. at 45, 565 N.E.2d at 495-96, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.

1189. Id. at 45, 565 N.E.2d at 496, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
1190. Id.

1191. Id.
1192. In 1987, the legislature created a commission to review the practice of
using staff employees in political campaigns. Later that year, the legislature
enacted the Ethics in Government Act, which amended the New York Public

Officers Law. See Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 3, 1987 N.Y. Laws
1404, 1411 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAWv § 73-a (McKinney
1988 & Supp. 1991)).
1193. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 52, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
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immunity afforded by the speech or debate clause. 1194
The court began its analysis by addressing the counts relating to
the use of the staff employees who worked on the campaigns.
First, the court explained that there was no provision in the penal
law that declared the defendant's conduct to be criminal. 1195 In
reaching this decision, the court noted that "[u]nder the State
Constitution, the Legislature alone has the power to authorize expenditures from the State treasury, and to 'regulate and fix the
wages or salaries and the hours of work or labor . . . of persons
employed by the state.' ' 1196 The court reasoned that legislative

law delegates power to legislators to appoint employees to assist
them and to determine the duties and hours at the legislators'
discretion. While declining to discuss ethics or propriety, the
court determined that there was no criminal violation of the penal
law with regard to the campaign workers. 1 19 7
Second, the court held that the constitutional provision which
prohibits use of state monies for "private undertaking" does not
provide for criminal prosecution in the event it is violated. 119 8
Although the state argued that the defendants' appropriations
were criminally prohibited by article VII, section 8 of the New
York State Constitution, 1199 the court concluded that this
provision had never been construed to "serve as a predicate for
1194. Id. at 53, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
1195. Id. at 49, 565 N.E.2d at 498, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 749.

1196. Id. at 46, 565 N.E.2d at 496, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (quoting N.Y.
CONST. art. XIII, § 14). Article XIII, section 14 of the New York State

Constitution provides that, "[t]he legislature may regulate and fix the wages or
salaries and the hours of work or labor ....

" Id.

1197. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 49, 565 N.E.2d at 498, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
749.

1198. Id. at 50, 565 N.E.2d at 498-99, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50.
1199. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8. The prosecution relied on Philips v.
Maurer, where a school board used direct facilities to advocate an affirmative
vote on a proposition not permitted by the Education Law. 67 N.Y.2d 672,
673-74, 490 N.E.2d 542, 543, 499 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (1986). In Philips, a
state agency sought to use agency facilities and personnel to advance a partisan
point of view. However, the case did not deal with legislative use of state
resources for political activities, which even the prosecutor conceded is
permissible to some extent. See Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 48, 565 N.E.2d at
497, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
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criminal prosecution.", 1200 The court examined the legislative
intent surrounding the enactment of article VII, section 8, and
stated "that it was never intended to be used in this manner.", 12 01
The court noted that the legislative history revealed that the
purpose of this provision was "to prevent improvidence. .. [in
order] to safeguard the credit of the state.- ' 1202 Lastly, the court
unequivocally stated that the provision was not enacted to prevent
or punish larceny, but rather its primary goal is "to prevent or
invalidate legislation which is fiscally unwise ....

"1203

Consequently, the court held that the defendants were not
criminally liable under article VII, section 8 for using the
employees to work on the campaigns. 1204
Because of the absence of criminal liability under the penal law
and the determination that article VII, section 8 was not intended
to be used as a predicate for criminal prosecution, it was unnecessary to inquire into the constitutional defenses regarding the
staff members who worked on campaigns.
The court then analyzed the defendants' appeals with regard to
the no-show employees. The court of appeals agreed with the appellate division that criminal prosecution was permissible with respect to the counts relating to the "no-show" employees. The
state's theory was that the defendants filed false instruments
stating that these employees performed "proper duties," and thus
"committed larceny [by inducing] the State to rely on the false
statements." 120 5 The court stated that "[h]ere it is alleged that
these employees did nothing, that the defendants knew this and
' 1206
that the defendants also knew that they had no duties."

Concluding that the allegations were sufficient to sustain these
1200. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 50, 565 N.E.2d at 498-99, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
749-50.

1201. Id. at 50, 565 N.E.2d at 499, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
1202. Id. at 51, 565 N.E.2d at 499, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (quoting People v.
Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 474, 132 N.E. 241, 244
(1921)).
1203. Id.
1204. Id. at 52, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 751.

1205. Id. at 53, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
1206. Id.
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criminal counts, 120 7 the court then analyzed the defendants'
constitutional defenses.
First, the defendants argued that the doctrine of separation of
powers prohibited the executive and judiciary branches of government from defining "proper duties" of the legislative staff.
The court noted that, notwithstanding a specific definition of
proper duties, at a minimum such a definition must include the
performance of some services. 120 8 Since no duties were
performed by these employees, the court stated that an inquiry to
determine what duties are proper was unnecessary. Accordingly,
the court held that there was no violation of the separation of
12 09
powers doctrine.
Second, the defendants contended that prosecution would violate legislative immunity because it would allow inquiry into a
legislator's acts and, more specifically, as to why an employee
was appointed and how that employee performed. 12 10 The court
noted that the speech or debate clause of the state constitution
provided that "'[f]or any speech or debate in either house of the
legislature, the members shall not be questioned in any other
place."1 2 1 1 The court recognized that it had not previously considered the scope of immunity under this clause but determined
that it should be treated as providing "at least as much protection
as the immunity granted by the comparable provision of the federal Constitution.- 12 12 Consequently, the court analyzed the fed-

eral provisions and noted that in Hutchinson v. Proxmire1 2 13 the
United States Supreme Court explained that the speech or debate
clause confers immunity for legislative acts but does not confer

immunity on all actions of a legislator, although they may be
lawful and expected of a legislator. 1214
The New York Court of Appeals stated that legislative acts are
1207. Id. (citing N.Y. Penal Law §§ 155.30-.35, 175.35 (McKinney 1988)).
1208.
1209.
1210.
1211.
1212.
1213.
1214.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 53, 565 N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11).

Id.
443 U.S. 111 (1979).
Id. at 124-30.
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"those which are an integral part of the legislative process, and
have been held to include votes and speeches on the floor of the
House as well as the underlying motivations for these
activities." ' 12 15 In addition, speeches and hearings which do not
take place on the house floor have also been entitled to legislative
immunity.12 16 However, immunity does not extend to acts which
a legislator performs in order to persuade constituents. Acts such
as speeches, newsletters and press releases are not protected by
this immunity. 12 17 Likewise, when the underlying motive is
unlawful, such as acceptance of a bribe, 12 18 no immunity
attaches even if the conduct related to the act was entitldd to
19
immunity. 12
Although the court did not decide how far the legislative immunity extended under the New York State Constitution, the
court stated that the immunity was clearly not "intended to
provide a sanctuary for legislators who would defraud the State
by knowingly placing on its payroll employees who were never
intended to do anything but receive State moneys." 1220
Therefore, the court held that the speech or debate clause did not
prohibit the prosecution of the counts relating to the "no-show"
122 1
employees.
Judge Simons dissented in part. He agreed with the majority
that the defendants' use of their regular employees for political
activities, as well as to legislative duties, should be
dismissed. 1222 He also agreed that the defendants should be
prosecuted for certifying the salary of the "no-show" employees
on the legislative payroll who did not perform any duties.
However, Judge Simons disagreed with the dismissal of the
1215. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 54, 565 N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at

752 (citing Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 126-27).
1216. Id. at 54, 565 N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (citing Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973)).
1217. Id.
1218. Id.
1219. Id.
1220. Id.
1221. Id. at 53, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
1222. Id. at 54-55, 565 N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
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charges relating to the defendants' unlawfully authorized payment
from state funds to staff employees "whose only duties consisted
of working for the candidates on the ... campaign." 12 2 3 Basing
his analysis on the existing penal law, Judge Simons stated that
"[c]ertifying their payment from State funds was criminal and the
counts alleging that the defendants did so should be
reinstated." ' 1224 He stated that the "[d]efendants authorized
payment of public funds for private purposes and thus their
conduct fell squarely within the scope of provisions proscribing
larcenous acts.- ' 1225 Contrary to the majority, Judge Simons
believed that the absence of a specific provision in the penal law
defining the defendant's conduct as criminal was irrelevant
because political activities are private, and in his view, the use of
public funds for such purposes was clearly improper. 1226

1223. Id. at 55, 565 N.E.2d at 501-02, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752-53 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
1224. Id. at 55, 565 N.E.2d at 502, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 753 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).

1225. Id. at 63, 565 N.E.2d at 507, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).

1226. Id. at 58, 565 N.E.2d at 503-04, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 754-55 (Simons, 3.,
dissenting).
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